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Abstract 
 
We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the question whether stability among 
the world anchor currencies (G3) is attainable. The theoretical model presented in this 
paper builds on a model of spatial competition and rests on a set of realistic assumptions 
related to the behavior of central banks, workings of exchange rate regimes, geography of 
money, and international monetary arrangements. We show that stability is attainable in 
the case of two anchor currencies, but not in the case of three. The empirical evidence 
provides some support for assumptions and conclusions of the model. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods System the world of money has been 
dominated by the three anchor currencies (G3) – the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the 
euro (formerly the Deutsche mark).1 Cohen (1998) made a case about the power of these 
currencies by forging the concept of the “authoritative domain” that combines 
transactions and territoriality – the functional as well as physical dimensions – into a 
single concept of use and authority. The size of an anchor currency’s authoritative 
domain grows when additional “satellite” currencies are linked to anchor currency via 
exchange rate regime. The G3 currencies are vehicle currencies whose function as an 
exchange medium extends far beyond domestic trade to wider use in international 
transactions. As a consequence, monetary transactions and their volumes represent a 
transmission mechanism that provides the central banks of anchor currencies control over 
satellite currencies. Since anchor currencies occupy larger shares of international output, 
trade and transactions, the economies of scale are further enhanced. And it is precisely 
the size of the authoritative domain that gives the issuer of a vehicle currency – central 
bank – power over other currencies.2 Thus, it is of pragmatic interest for the anchor 
currencies to capture satellite currencies. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze stability among the three anchor currencies that 
govern current monetary affaires. First, we introduce a two stage game to model the 
dynamics of how anchor currencies compete for satellite currencies. Second, we 
operationalize the theoretical concept of the authoritative domain developed by Cohen 
(1998). Third, we bring an empirical evidence to illustrate whether a tripolar currency 
world would, in fact, provide a workable framework to achieve the desired stability 
among the anchor currencies and their exchange rates. 
To accomplish the above goals, we apply a model of spatial competition to assess 
exchange rate stability among the G3 anchor currencies using, in addition to Cohen’s 
arguments, an historical account of existing post-war exchange rate regimes, exchange 
rate development, and the evolution of crucial monetary variables. We introduce a 
                                                 
1 Given the steadily growing importance of the Deutsch mark among the European currencies after World 
War II, we take the liberty of extending the Deutsch mark to the euro since such continuity greatly 
simplifies the empirical part of this paper. There is no other motivation beyond this. 
2 “Only a privileged few states with the most widely circulated currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, Europe’s 
new euro (succeeding Germany’s Deutsche mark), and the Japanese yen, can realistically aspire to a 
unilateralist leadership strategy”, Cohen (2004, p. xv). 
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modification of the Hotelling (1929) location model to study the formation of areas of 
influence in exchange rate policy. Like firms in the Eaton and Lipsey (1975) model that 
compete for customers distributed along a line, we consider an analogous situation for the 
central banks of the anchor currencies (details are given in Section 3). Through their 
objective of price stability, and by using a latent variable (the major component of which 
is the interest rate) as a positioning instrument in a policy space, the central banks attract 
satellite currencies that tie to the anchor currencies via exchange rate regimes.3 The 
power over satellite currencies is not a one-way process. A tie between satellite 
currencies and an anchor currency greatly reduces volatility within such an informal 
currency area. Reduced volatility, in turn, promotes international trade and increases 
stability, further reducing the costs of business activities for all participating economies, 
of both anchor as well as satellite currencies. In addition, satellite currency countries also 
benefit from enhanced price stability if they tie their currencies to an anchor currency 
with lower inflation.4 To repeat, the above benefits constitute practical reasons why 
anchor currencies benefit when satellite currencies tie to them. 
The game considered in this paper can be understood as the central banks of the 
anchor currencies competing for shares of the currency holdings of satellite countries; 
that is, those whose policy has a negligible impact. The preferences of the satellite 
countries for the policies of the anchor currency's central bank to which they are linked 
are assumed to be distributed along a line. We show that with some changes in 
assumptions, the results of the standard spatial competition model continue to hold. 
Specifically, we find for a large range of parameters stability in the case of two anchor 
currencies, but instability in the case of three. A caveat is that our model is highly 
stylized and aims at long-term behavior.5 Furthermore, the purpose of the model is less 
intended to provide a precise explanation of observed patterns of exchange rate 
development, and more to present an illustration of possible consequences if the number 
of anchor currencies is reduced from three to two. The empirical part of the paper 
provides some evidence that our assumptions are realistic and that the observed 
                                                 
3 Such a latent variable may reflect constraints of a central bank, which we do not consider for simplicity of 
our model. 
4 Such import of low inflation is theoretically grounded as well as empirically documented (see Giavazzi 
and Giovannini 1989, among others). 
5 By this token it does not address other aspects of anchor currency policies, such as those related to 
international trade and growth. 
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phenomena are consistent with our model’s predictions, but the model itself is much too 
simplifying to provide straightforward testable hypotheses. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the post-war developments 
among G3 currencies and introduce further motivation. In Section 3 we present and 
analyze the formal theoretical model. Section 4 describes the data and brings empirical 
extensions to illustrate our point about the quest for exchange rate stability. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
 
2. Account of Exchange Rate Developments and Further Motivation 
An anchor currency captures a satellite currency when the latter is tied to the former via 
some more or lees strict exchange rate regime. Options of such a tie range from a simple 
peg to managed float with an anchor currency as a reference currency. A “currency 
capture” is excluded when a satellite currency follows pure float. As the development of 
exchange rate arrangements is an important issue for the analysis in the paper, we bring a 
brief account of the relevant points. 
In terms of exchange rate arrangements, there has been growing support for 
abandoning regimes between hard pegs and free floats. In a world of high capital 
mobility, countries must choose one of the extremes; floating or hard peg. Such a bipolar 
view is frequently referred to as a “corner solution” or “hollowing out of intermediate 
regimes.” It was initially discussed by Eichengreen (1994); relevant arguments were 
further provided by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Goldstein (1999), and Eichengreen and 
Fisher (2001). Proponents of the bipolar view argue that pegs or floats are the only 
regimes compatible with the current degree of market integration and that countries with 
high capital mobility should discard intermediate regimes in favor of extreme ones. 
The debate on monetary and exchange rate arrangements is not concentrated entirely 
on Europe or the United States, an impression that may emerge from the stress on euro-
versus-dollar advances. A comprehensive discussion of a wide range of currency regime 
changes (actual and potential) around the world is given by Cohen (2004). Further, Bird 
and Rajan (2002), for example, discuss key aspects of the new Asian financial 
architecture and focus on the reform of domestic financial systems, exchange rate 
regimes, and regional liquidity arrangements. Madden, Savage, and McDonald (2000) 
discuss stabilizing Asia-Pacific exchange rates by establishing a system of pegs, bands or 
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target zones around the Japanese yen.6 Frieden and Stein (2001) provide a systematic 
understanding of exchange rate issues by analyzing the political economy of currency 
policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Since the US dollar, Japanese yen, Deutsch mark, and most recently the euro have 
become the anchor currencies in the post-war period, they also tend to be the most 
vulnerable to volatility. Exchange rates across the three anchor currencies were 
particularly volatile in the post-1971 period and our earlier discussion implies the same 
with respect to the euro. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, attempts to 
reduce the volatility of exchange rates in economically interconnected Europe led to 
creation of the “Snake”7 in 1973 and the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The 
former Deutsch mark represented the largest weight in a currency basket used to limit 
volatility of the participating European currencies. Later, economic integration evolved 
into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the establishment of the European 
Central Bank, and the adoption of the euro in 1999. Further enlargement of the EMU is 
expected, since countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 were given no option but to join 
the EMU at a later date.8 
Recent developments in the foreign exchange market and the steps of various 
monetary authorities illustrate phases of instability among the anchor currencies. For 
example, significant losses in the US dollar’s value have formed the basis for complaints 
that the euro has borne a disproportionate share of the dollar's decline.9 Complaints about 
overvaluation or undervaluation of the US dollar relative to the euro have their 
predecessors in the context of the Deutsch mark and other currencies under the former 
European Monetary System (EMS), as well as in past disputes on “fair” parity between 
the dollar and the yen. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among key currencies in the 
post-war period. 
                                                 
6 This strategy requires the compromise of domestic policy autonomy and a symmetric reaction to 
economic shocks to ensure the lowest cost. The authors suggest that the economic preconditions for a yen 
bloc are, however, not yet in place. 
7 This group of countries, the so-called “Snake”, consisted of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Denmark; it also included France on several occasions. In 1973, these countries fixed their exchange rates 
with each other while jointly floating against other countries. 
8 For a classic in-depth analysis of the EMS, as well as its relevance for the rest of the world, see Giavazzi 
and Giovanninni (1989). For a description of European integration around a common currency and for an 
explanation as to why many of the EU states have agreed to sacrifice their monetary independence, see 
Overturf (2000). 
9 From 2001 to early 2004 the dollar  fell by 33% against the euro and by 15% against the Japanese yen. 
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As we noted earlier, we cannot expect stability in the system of currencies to be 
attainable. We aim to illustrate this point with the aid of a stylized formal model based on 
the simple and widely recognized premise that a central bank’s objective is price stability. 
The interest rate, as the main factor in a latent one-dimensional policy instrument, is used 
to conduct bank policy. The model and motivation for it are described in the next section. 
 
3. Model and Equilibrium Analysis 
Cohen (1998) introduced the notion of a currency’s “authoritative domain” by combining 
the functional dimension (transactions) as well as the physical dimension (territoriality) 
of money into “a single amalgam of use and authority.” The authoritative domain of an 
anchor currency expands when the central bank of a satellite currency decides to peg its 
domestic currency to an anchor currency. In effect, control over the value of such a 
satellite currency is ceded to a dominating or anchor foreign currency. The authoritative 
domain of a foreign anchor currency expands with the number and, more specifically, 
volume of satellite currencies that are tied via various exchange rate regimes to the 
anchor currency. Under these circumstances, satellite currencies do not have reason to 
disappear, though their authoritative domain is greatly eroded. Consequently, transactions 
and their volumes represent an economic transmission mechanism that gives the central 
banks of anchor currencies control over satellite currencies. These economies of scale are 
further enhanced because “the currency of a country that has a large share of international 
output, trade and finance has a natural advantage” (Jeffrey Frankel as quoted in Cohen, 
1998, p. 97). 
Given this reality of the international geography of money, we build a model of spatial 
competition among the central banks of anchor currencies in a two-stage game setup. 
There are n anchor currencies, each attached to one large country (or to a group of 
countries that form a monetary union). In addition, there is a continuum of satellite 
countries, each with its own currency. A satellite country is defined by its monetary 
policy having only a negligible influence on world markets. The policy space of the 
central banks of the anchor currencies is one-dimensional. This one-dimensional policy 
space is indeed the result of a set of policy choices, but for simplicity we collapse it into 
one single variable: the interest rate, which is the dominating policy instrument as well as 
the most significant loading factor of our formal generalization. Within this policy space, 
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there is a range that fulfills the basic goals of the central bank. Normalize this feasible 
policy space to [0, 1].10 
The objective of an anchor central bank in our model is price stability. An independent 
central bank prefers domestic policy autonomy to exchange rate management, as it has no 
socio-political incentives to produce competitive, stable exchange rates. Its goals are 
predominantly to achieve low domestic inflation.11 Indeed, in reality, usually price 
stability and, hence, some type of inflation management belongs to the explicit goals of a 
central bank. Implicitly, central banks may be concerned about economic growth or trade 
deficit, since these are related to the bank’s foreign exchange reserves. Thus, these goals 
also serve to increase price stability, albeit indirectly.12 Central bank positioning within 
the policy space is done by a latent (unobserved) policy variable resulting from broadly 
defined relations and constraints which are, for the sake of simplicity, not considered in 
our setup. Instead, we simplify the composed policy variable by making the interest rate 
its main factor, which is naturally used for positioning purposes. 
Using standard theory, the origin of a monetary base can be inferred from a country’s 
choice of exchange rate regime. If a country favors a floating exchange regime, then the 
monetary authority has, by definition, full control over its monetary policy, no exchange 
rate policy, and a monetary base whose origin is entirely domestic. On the other hand, if 
a country prefers to peg its domestic currency to a foreign one, then the central bank de 
facto resigns from an independent monetary policy, conducts an explicit exchange rate 
policy, and has a monetary base of purely foreign origin.13 Any exchange rate regime 
between the two extremes means a different extent of independence in both its monetary 
                                                 
10 Replacing the interval by an open interval does not change the results. Further, given that our policy 
variable is assumed to primarily reflect the interest rate, our one-dimensional policy space is better 
characterized as a line and not, for example, as a circle, as a circular policy space would imply that very 
high and very low interest rates correspond to the same policy. We address generalizations to a multi-
dimensional policy space below. 
11 Baines (2001) documents three trends in the political economy of exchange rate policy in advanced 
industrialized countries: unprecedented rise in capital mobility, favor of floating exchange rates (at least 
officially) and need for sound monetary policy, and high levels of central bank independence. These trends 
result in monetary policy directed at maintaining domestic price stability above all other concerns. In our 
model we employ price stability as a central bank’s objective. 
12 In any event, in our stylized model we restrict attention to the single and arguably dominant motive of 
price stability. In reality, specific goals vary across central banks but we prefer to keep the model tractable 
over maximizing its realism. We might actually not lose too much in terms of realism due to our 
simplification. For example, we do not incorporate (explicitly) trade into our model since both theory and 
empirics show no effect of the exchange rate system on trade or welfare (see Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 
2000). 
13 In this context we can say that an anchor currency “absorbs” the currency of a satellite country. 
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and exchange rate policies as well as a mixed origin of its monetary base. Hence, by 
knowing the (true) adopted exchange regime we may identify the amount of domestic 
money (of a satellite currency) linked to a particular anchor currency via the exchange 
rate regime, and express this amount in terms of the anchor currency. The combined 
amounts may be understood as a proxy for the extent of the anchor currency’s 
authoritative domain or, conversely, for the dependency of satellite currencies. 
We define the dependencies of satellite currencies on anchor currencies in the context 
of arguments given by Reinhardt and Rogoff (2004). Based on their categorization of de 
facto (true) exchange regimes, we are able to trace the preference of satellite currencies’ 
central banks with respect to anchor central banks and, thus, to classify shares of foreign 
currency holdings. In this way we can proxy for the anchor currency’s authoritative 
domain more precisely than relying on official exchange regime categorization, which 
often does not reflect reality. Formally, let C be the amount of domestic currency 
expressed in terms of foreign anchor currencies to which a domestic currency is linked 
via a particular exchange rate regime, and  be the part of C expressed in anchor 
currency i that corresponds to the weight of i in the currency basket. Clearly . 
This convenient notation covers all possible cases outlined above: 
ic
Ccn
i i
=∑ =1
1) when n=0, then C=0 and the satellite currency is floating; 
2) when n=1, then the satellite currency is pegged to an anchor currency; and 
3) when n>1, then the satellite currency is under a currency basket peg regime.14 
Hence, central banks of anchor currencies attract, through their policy choice, satellite 
currencies that tie with anchor currencies via exchange rate regimes. Satellite countries 
have a preference for location in the policy space of the anchor currency to which they 
link their (satellite) currencies. The most preferred locations of satellite currencies are 
distributed with respect to a density f on [0,1]. Satellite countries’ preferences differ 
because their economic conditions differ, i.e. while some are exclusively interested in 
price stability, others might prefer a somewhat less restrictive policy in order to stimulate 
growth. 
Our basic assumption is that price stability for a large country i (with an anchor 
currency) depends on two factors: the policy (interest rate) of the central bank, xi, and the 
                                                 
14 More details on the construction of monetary aggregates are given in section 4 in conjunction with our 
empirical assessment. 
 7
share  of domestic currency, expressed in anchor foreign currency i, that is held by 
satellite countries whose domestic currency is linked via a specific exchange rate regime 
to anchor currencies. More precisely, the objective function of a central bank is 
, where  is a proxy for price stability, and is increasing in  but decreasing 
in the absolute difference between its actual policy xi and its preferred policy .15 
Therefore, when choosing its policy, an anchor currency’s central bank has to consider 
not only the direct effect on price stability, but also the indirect effect via the change in 
the share of satellite currencies linked to it.16 
is
( iii sxG , )
                                                
iG is
ip
We analyze this interaction between the central banks of anchor currencies and those 
of satellite countries as a two-stage game. In this game, the central banks of anchor 
currencies first decide simultaneously on their policy, i.e. on their location in the policy 
space, and then the satellite countries choose their foreign currency holdings. More 
precisely, the two stages are as follows:  
1. The n anchor currency central banks choose simultaneously their policies 
. nxx ,...,1
2. After observing  the satellite countries choose their basket of anchor 
currencies. 
nxx ,...,1
Our model resembles the spatial competition model by Eaton and Lipsey (1975), but 
differs in three respects. First and most importantly, we introduce the preferences of 
anchor currencies’ central banks over their location in the policy space. Second, as will 
be seen below, satellite countries do not exclusively choose the anchor currency closest to 
their own preferred policy, but rather a mix of respective closest currencies on both sides 
such that the weighted average policy of these currencies corresponds to the preferred 
policy. Finally, central banks can choose identical policies, in which case the linked 
 
15 The objective function Gi is increasing in si since the connection of satellite currencies to an anchor 
currency decreases volatility in the informal currency area, and hence fosters international trade and further 
increases stability. Such effects naturally reduce the costs of business activities. Since the economic 
conditions in the different anchor currency countries differ, they have, not considering the effects of their 
policy choices on satellite countries’ pegs, different preferences with respect to their policy. 
16 Devereux, Shi, and Xu (2004) deliver a model of monetary policy under a US dollar standard and 
describe how to conduct a monetary policy once an anchor currency rounds up satellite currencies. Their 
work potentially can motivate our own, as well as lend support to our model which, besides other things, 
describes how to get to the point when satellite currencies are linked to anchor currencies via foreign 
exchange standards. 
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countries choose baskets with equal shares in these currencies.17 We show below that two 
central results of the basic spatial competition model, namely existence of a pure-strategy 
equilibrium in the case of two anchor currencies, but non-existence of a pure-strategy 
equilibrium in the case of three anchor currencies, continue to hold if the costs of 
deviating from the preferred policy pi are not too high and if the preferred policies of 
central banks of anchor currencies are relatively homogeneous compared to the 
distribution of preferred policies of satellite countries. 
Consider first the behavior of the satellite countries in the second stage. Since their 
effective interest rate corresponds to the weighted average of the interest rates attached to 
the currencies in their basket, they aim to peg to a basket such that the weighted average 
of the interest rates of the anchor currencies in the basket is as close as possible to their 
preferred policy l, because this implies that the basket reflects their own preferred policy 
as closely as possible. We assume, furthermore, that as a secondary criterion, a satellite 
country prefers to include in the basket anchor currencies whose policy choice is closer to 
their own preferred policy (as this might lead to greater stability of the basket). If a 
satellite country has a choice between two different baskets that have the same weighted 
average policy, it chooses the basket that minimizes the maximal difference between l 
and the policies of the anchors included in the basket. 
Given the satellite countries’ preferences over the baskets they could peg to, their 
optimal choice will be a mix of the closest anchor currencies, given each possible 
combination of policies among the anchors. More precisely, as above let C be the amount 
of domestic currency expressed in terms of foreign anchor currencies to which a domestic 
currency is linked via a particular exchange rate regime, and  be the part of C 
expressed in anchor currency i that corresponds to the weight of i in the currency basket 
( ). Without loss of generality, assume 
ic
Ccn
i i
=∑ =1 nxx ≤≤ ...1 . If 1xl ≤  then the country 
will choose a currency basket consisting only of currency 1, Cc =1 ; in such a case the 
currency basket reduces to a simple peg. If  then the country will choose . If 
 then the country will choose a mix of currencies i and , 
nxl ≥ Ccn =
1+≤≤ ii xlx 1+i iii xx lxi Cc −−++= 11 , 
ii
i
xx
xl
i Cc −
−
+ += 11 . Note that ( ) lCxcxc iiii =+ ++ /11  and that Cci =  if ixl = . If  then ii xx =−1
                                                 
17 Such behavior can be observed during periods of post-war development and was a prominent feature of 
emerging economies during the last two decades of the 20th century. 
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ii
i
xx
lxC
ii cc −
−
− +
+==
1
1
21  and similarly if 21 ++ = ii xx  then ii ixx xlCii cc −−++ +== 1221  (and 
correspondingly if more than 2 x are identical).18 Below, we will consider subgame-
perfect equilibria, where in each subgame following a choice of policies by the anchor 
currency countries, satellite countries will choose their best reply, i.e. choose their 
baskets as above. Thus when we discuss different equilibria below, we will only describe 
the behavior of the anchor currency countries explicitly. 
Let us now turn to the first stage of the game, the anchors’ choice of locations in the 
policy space. Assume for simplicity that C is identical for all satellite countries and 
normalize . Without loss of generality, this can be achieved by replacing the density 
of satellite countries f by the density of in-foreign-currency-expressed holdings  with 
1=C
∗f
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )∫∗ = 10 dllClf lClflf  for all , where [ 1,0∈l ] ( )lC  denotes the average currency holding of the 
countries whose preferred location is l. Denote by  the share of currency i of the total 
in-foreign-currency-expressed holdings by satellite countries. 
is
Each anchor currency’s central bank has a preferred policy . As noted above, the 
aim of an anchor currency’s central bank is to maximize 
ip
( )iii sxG , , where  is assumed 
to be linear increasing in  but the costs of deviating from the preferred policy pi 
(henceforth ‘location costs’) is convex in the absolute difference. More precisely, let 
 with 
iG
is
( ) ( iiiiii pxLssxG −−=, ) ( ) ( )yLyL =− , ( ) 00 =′L  and ( ) 0>′′ yL .19 Assume 
furthermore for simplicity that the preferred policies of satellite countries are distributed 
according to a uniform distribution on [0,1] and that location costs are quadratic, 
 with .20 Since the leading economies are more alike than the whole 
spectrum of countries, the preferred policies of central banks of anchor currencies are 
assumed to be relatively similar compared to the distribution of preferences of satellite 
currencies’ central banks. Furthermore, it appears that small deviations from the preferred 
policies have a relatively small impact on stability compared to ; hence a is assumed to 
be small enough such that concerns for location costs do not dominate concerns for the 
( ) ( )2yayL = 0>a
is
                                                 
18 Modern monetary history documents that  the number of currencies in a basket usually ranges from 2 to 
5. The basket of currencies within the former EMS is an exception due to the institutional setup. 
19 Note that the cost function is the same for all anchor countries; only differs. ip
20 We will elaborate below on generalizations. 
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share of currency holdings . is
 
Proposition 1: Let there be two anchor currencies and let their preferred policies be 
. Then  21 pp <
(a) There is an equilibrium 2121 == xx  if ap 41211 −≥  and ap 41212 +≤ .  
(b) If app 2112 >−  and ( ) appapp 41212211 −−≤−− , then (  with )21, xx
apx 4111 +=  and apx 4122 −=  forms an equilibrium.  
(c) Otherwise there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. 
The proof extends the logic of the basic Hotelling game to the case with location costs. It 
involves nothing but checking systematically that under the given conditions no central 
bank of the anchor currencies has an incentive to deviate, while in all other constellations 
of policies at least one of them does have an incentive to deviate. For details and proof of 
the Proposition 1, see the Appendix. 
While the proof is somewhat tedious, the results are intuitive. Part (a) says that if the 
preferred policies are close enough to the median of the distribution of small countries, 
such that marginal location costs are smaller than ½ at the median (note that if 21 xx ≠ , 
the absolute value of the derivative of  with respect to  is ½), then the classical result 
that both central banks choose the location at the median survives. Obviously, this is the 
only equilibrium where both central banks choose the same policy since otherwise a 
marginal deviation would lead to an increase in  at essentially zero location costs. Part 
(b) says that if the preferred policies are sufficiently far apart, both central banks will 
choose policies such that marginal location costs are equal to marginal gains in , i.e. ½. 
Note that this implies that chosen policies are closer together than the preferred policies. 
is ix
is
is
( ) appapp 41212211 −−≤−−  ensures that neither of the two banks has an incentive to 
“pass” the other bank.   
For example, if  then there is an equilibrium at 1=a 21  if 411 ≥p  and 432 ≤p . The 
range for  and  such that 1p 2p 2121 == xx  is an equilibrium decreases in a. Similarly for 
 if 1=a 2112 >− pp , there is an equilibrium 4111 += px , 4122 −= px  as long as 
( ) 41212211 −−≤−− pppp . Thus, in order for such an equilibrium to exist, the 
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preferences of central banks of anchor currencies have to be very different, but the range 
where such an equilibrium exists increases in a. 
The above logic also applies to more general distributions of the preferred policies of 
satellite countries and to more general convex location costs. In particular, if L is 
sufficiently small and the preferred policies of the two central banks of anchor currencies 
are relatively close to the median of f, then there is an equilibrium where both choose 
policies equal to the median. If the preferred policies are rather different and location 
costs are high, then there is an equilibrium where they choose different policies (which 
are, however, closer together than their preferred policies). In the first case, where 
concerns for location costs are dominated by concerns for the share of satellite countries, 
the minimal differentiation result holds, whereas if location costs dominate concerns for 
shares in satellite countries, there is an equilibrium with unequal policies. 
Note that since conditions (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive, the pure-strategy 
equilibrium (if it exists) is unique. Hence, in a finitely repeated game the equilibrium play 
will be repeated and the situation is stable in the sense that the policies of the two anchor 
currencies are stable over time and that satellite countries do not change their exchange 
rate regimes. In the case of an equilibrium of type (a) the policies will change if, due to 
external shocks, the preferred policies of the satellite countries shift. They will, however, 
change in a parallel fashion provided that the shift is not too radical, because the 
equilibrium policies will stay at the median as long as the condition in (a) remains 
fulfilled. The policies will, however, not change if the preferred policies of the central 
banks of anchor currencies shift as long as condition (a) holds. But they will shift if the 
equilibrium is of type (b). Furthermore, if the preferred policies of the central banks of 
anchor currencies move closer together over time, we can move from an equilibrium of 
type (b) to one of type (a) (if preferred policies are relatively symmetric to the median of  
f) or to non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium (if they are highly asymmetric). In an 
infinitely repeated game, Folk-theorem arguments imply that we get additional equilibria. 
Repeated play of the stage-game equilibrium is, however, also one equilibrium of the 
infinitely repeated game such that if the conditions in (a) or (b) hold, a stable pattern 
would be one equilibrium (and the only one that does not require any punishment threats 
to be stabilized). 
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Proposition 2: Let  and 3=n 321 ppp << . 
(a) If 
(1) app 4112 ≥− ,  
(2) app 4123 ≥− ,  
(3) ( )212163222167221 },max{ 3132 ppapp appapp −≤−+−−+−+ , 
(4) ( )223163222167322 }1,1max{ 3121 ppapp appapp −≤−++−−+−−+ , 
then ( aa ppp 4132411 ,, −+ ) is an equilibrium. 
(b) Let apx 4133 −=  and 31 3xx = . If apxp 41112 +≤≤  and 
(5) 32343185
2
39
8
39
8 21 papapp pa −+−+≤ , 
then  is an equilibrium.  ( 311 ,, xxx )
(c) Let apx 4111 +=  and 3 23 1+= xx . If 23413 pxp a ≤≤−  and 
(6) 122225
2
111 1212348482 papappaapapp a +−+++−+≥ , 
then  is an equilibrium.  ( 331 ,, xxx )
This is just a mirror image of case (b). 
(d) Otherwise there is no pure-strategy equilibrium. 
As for proposition 1, the proof is somewhat tedious but involves only checking 
systematically that given the above conditions, no central bank has an incentive to 
deviate, while in all other constellations of policies, at least one bank has an incentive to 
deviate. For details and proof of the Proposition 2, see the Appendix. While more 
technical assumptions are needed here than in Proposition 1 to ensure that in the given 
equilibrium no bank would like to deviate to a position just marginally beyond the 
position of one of the other banks, the main results are again intuitive. In case (a), 
conditions (1) and (2) ensure that if banks 1 and 3 move to the positions where marginal 
location costs are equal to the marginal gains in the share (i.e. ½), bank 1 is still to the left 
of bank 2 and bank 3 to the right of bank 2. Since bank 2 cannot change its share by 
moving between banks 1 and 3, the only such constellation that is an equilibrium is that 
bank 2 chooses its preferred policy. For case (b) note that independent of a, a necessary 
requirement is aaaa pxxxpxpp 4124114113412323 22 +≥+=+−≥+−=− , whereas 
app 4112 ≤− , hence the preferences of bank 2 are much closer to those of bank 1 than to 
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those of bank 3. A parallel requirement applies to case (c). Thus cases (b) and (c) involve 
situations where two banks whose preferred policies are relatively close, will choose the 
same policy (resembling the formation of a monetary (policy) union) while the third bank 
whose preferred policy is very different, will choose a policy such that its marginal 
location costs are equal to the marginal gain in the share (i.e. ½).  
Hence existence of a pure strategy equilibrium requires that at least one central bank has 
preferences very different from the other central banks. Note in particular that there is no 
equilibrium where all three banks choose the same location. In this case, they would all 
receive , but a marginal deviation would allow a bank to capture at least 
 at a negligible increase in location costs.  
3/1=is
2/1=is
Let us consider again the case 1=a  for illustration. Conditions (1) and (2) imply that 
an equilibrium of type (a) only exists if 4123 ≥− pp  and 4112 ≥− pp , that is, if the 
preferred policies of central banks of anchor currencies are highly heterogeneous. 
Conditions (3) and (4) are even more restrictive, requiring for example, that for 01 =p  
and 212 =p  that 4153 ≥p  or that for 212 =p  and 13 =p  that 4151 1−≤p . The range of 
parameters such that an equilibrium of type (a) exists increases in a. An equilibrium of 
type (b) only exists if the preferences of banks 1 and 2 are relatively similar and those of 
bank 3 are quite different. In particular, if a = 1, then even for 13 =p  and, hence, 433 =x , 
4
1
21 ≤< pp  is necessary. Hence, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists only if 
preferences are highly heterogeneous or if location costs are very high.  
If, as we argued above, central banks of anchor currencies are relatively homogeneous 
in their preferences compared to satellite countries and if the weight they attach to 
satellite countries being linked to their currency is large compared to the costs of 
marginal deviations from the preferred policy, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies 
with . With , however, there is an equilibrium where both central banks of 
anchor currencies choose a policy at the median of f, i.e. the basic results of the standard 
spatial competition model still hold. 
3=n 2=n
The qualitative results of proposition 2 should also hold for more general convex cost 
functions and more general distributions of preferences of satellite countries.21 In 
                                                 
21 In the latter case,  would in general not hold any more in type (a) equilibrium, because density f 22 px =
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particular, if central banks’ preferences are relatively homogeneous compared to the 
preferences of satellite countries and location costs are not excessively high, there is no 
equilibrium in pure strategies. The logic is the same as in the standard spatial competition 
model: banks 1 and 3 would like to choose locations close to . In that case  would be 
small, but bank 2 could increase  at only a small increase in location costs by deviating 
to 
2x 2s
2s
ε−1x  or ε+3x . 
In a (finitely) repeated game the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium means 
that the actual choices of central banks in period t do not form an equilibrium. Therefore, 
at least one central bank would like to change its policy. Hence, the configuration of 
locations of central banks of anchor currencies will change from period t to , even 
without external shocks and, moreover, not in a parallel fashion.  
1+t
In other words, if there is no pure-strategy equilibrium there is only a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium and naturally the mixed strategies will (in general) yield different realizations 
and hence different locations of anchor currencies in each period. Thus we would expect 
fluctuating policies of the anchor currencies to follow a random pattern. As a 
consequence, the currency baskets of at least some of the satellite countries will also 
change from period to period.22 
The difference between the cases 2=n  and 3=n  can be summarized as follows. If 
preferences of central banks of anchor currencies are highly heterogeneous or location 
costs are very high, then for both 2=n  and 3=n  a pure-strategy equilibrium exists 
where central banks choose different policies. But if, as we assume, preferences of central 
banks of anchor currencies are relatively similar compared to the distribution of satellite 
countries’ preferences and location costs are not very high, then the result of the model 
without location costs survives, namely that for 2=n  there is an equilibrium where both 
central banks choose a policy at the median of the distribution of satellite countries’ 
preferences, and if , then there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. In the latter case, 
the implementation of mixed-strategy equilibrium policies would follow a random 
pattern.23 
3=n
                                                                                                                                                 
2s 2x 321 xxx <<is not constant and hence is not the same for all  with .  
22 Such behavior can be observed in the case of emerging economies in our sample. 
23 Our results indicating stability with two anchor currencies are also broadly in line with numerous 
theoretical models of foreign exchange trading that use a two currency framework (see Matsuyama, 
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Although general results for  can be derived by a similar extension of Eaton and 
Lipsey (1975), this work is beyond the scope of this paper. Eaton and Lipsey (1975) also 
show that the results are quite different for a higher dimensional choice space. This fact 
would most likely carry over to our model if we extended it to a multi-dimensional policy 
space. However, even if we considered a higher-dimensional policy space, our model 
would always be a substantial simplification. Hence, our results can only be an 
illustration of the possible impact of changes in the number of anchor currencies. 
Therefore, we prefer to adhere to the comparatively simple one-dimensional version of 
the model. 
3>n
Our results also give insight into the notion of a currency’s authoritative domain as 
explicated by Cohen (1998). We extend his arguments by showing that the existence of 
equilibrium strongly depends on the number of competing anchor currencies. 
 
4. Data and Statistical Inference 
4.1 Data and Quantitative Evidence 
We collected data on the exchange rates of domestic currencies with respect to the US 
dollar, the Deutsch mark/ECU/euro, and the Japanese yen. Furthermore, we assembled 
data on monetary aggregates (in terms of M2), short-term interest rates, type of exchange 
rate regimes, inflation and aggregate output for 30 OECD countries plus Russia. Because 
of their economic capacity and derived amount of monetary aggregate used, we consider 
the OECD countries as a proxy for the world.24 Short-term interest rates are defined as 
three-month money market rates, or rates on similar financial instruments. The span of 
our yearly data is 1963 to 2004, with the exception of emerging economies where 
meaningful data are available only from the mid-1980s. All data were assembled from 
OECD Economic Outlook statistics, IMF International Financial Statistics and, for 
particular missing data, from the central banks and finance ministries of the respective 
countries.25 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kiyotaki, and Matsui, 1993; Zhou, 1997 among others). Moreover, the non-existence of equilibrium in pure 
strategies in the case of three currencies corresponds to the results of Rey (2001), where the three-country 
model of the world economy has three partial and three total equilibria, where each currency can be the 
vehicle. 
24Because of this, we do not incorporate into our sample a number of satellite countries. 
25 Due to data inconsistencies we do not cover the 1950s in our analysis. This exclusion does not constitute 
a deficiency since the Bretton Woods System was firmly in place at that time and no repositioning implied 
by our model could take place. 
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We construct the sums of monetary aggregates (M2) of satellite currencies to anchor 
currencies based on the description of de facto (true) exchange regimes provided in 
Reinhardt and Rogoff (2004). In accord with our model in section 3, we define C as the 
amount of domestic (satellite) currency expressed in terms of foreign anchor currencies to 
which a domestic currency is linked via the particular exchange rate regime;  is the part 
of C expressed in anchor currency i that corresponds to the weight of i in the currency 
basket ( ).26 This convenient notation covers all possible cases that are of 
interest: when n=0, then C=0 and the satellite currency is floating; when n=1, then the 
satellite currency is pegged to an anchor currency, and when n>1, then the satellite 
currency is under a currency basket peg regime. If a country favors, for instance, a 
currency basket peg, then the weights of currencies in a basket are used to determine the 
importance of anchor currencies with respect to satellite currency holdings. Since 
currencies in a basket usually represent those most frequently used in the conduct of 
international trade or international monetary operations of a particular country, such an 
approach is fully justified. 
ic
Ccn
i i
=∑ =1
In sum, we specify the amount of a satellite currency linked to a particular anchor 
currency via the exchange rate regime, and express this amount in terms of such anchor 
currency. We believe that the combined amounts may be understood as a reasonable 
proxy for the extent of an anchor currency’s authoritative domain, despite the fact that 
“the data simply do not exist to accurately report all cross-border use of currencies, let 
alone more subtle relationships” as Cohen (1998, p. 24) accurately notes. We trust that 
our construction is a realistic way to operationalize the concept of the authoritative 
domain. 
The overall situation with respect to developments of monetary aggregates from the 
1960s to 2004 is captured in Figures 2-5. They illustrate how the share of monetary 
aggregate linked to an anchor currency as well as the share of countries linked through 
their exchange rate regimes to anchor currencies evolved over time. In accordance with 
historical developments we see a massive shift away from the US dollar after the collapse 
                                                 
26 Technically, C should also include foreign exchange reserves of central banks of satellite currencies held 
in anchor currencies. However, since those foreign exchange reserves consist of currencies already issued 
by the central banks of anchor currencies, we cannot consider them. Aside from this, the structure of 
foreign exchange reserves held usually reflects the weights of the anchor currencies within the exchange 
rate regime. 
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of the Bretton Woods System, and a proportionally pronounced gain in Europe. While the 
share of currencies linked to the US dollar stabilized in the late 1980s, the European 
currency has been steadily solidifying its share. The share of currencies not linked to any 
anchor currency has never exceeded 30 per cent and meanders over time; the share of 
monetary aggregate of these countries tends to be negligible. The Japanese yen has a 
significant share of money linked to it, hovering around 30 per cent of the total. 
Figure 6 presents the total amount of monetary aggregate of all considered currencies 
divided into three groups in terms of exchange rate regime link. Currencies are linked 
either to the US dollar, to the Deutsch mark/ECU/euro, or to the Japanese yen. In the 
context of our model the US dollar clearly dominates from the 1960s to 1971-1973. This 
is when the number of anchor currencies is just one; n = 1. Period 1971-1979 represents a 
transition after the Bretton Woods System collapsed. We see a departure from state n = 1 
towards n > 1. During this period there exist no obvious candidates that would firmly 
establish a situation of two anchor currencies in which n = 2. Developments after 1979 
illustrate the lack of two dominating currencies, since the amount of monetary aggregate 
of currencies linked neither to the US dollar nor to the Deutsch mark/ECU/euro is 
substantial. Most, but not all, of the non-linked aggregate originates in Japan. Hence, the 
post-1979 period represents a situation in which, in the framework of our model, 
unquestionably n > 2 and no pure-strategy equilibrium exists. 
Short-term interest rates, plotted in Figure 7, allow us to detect changes in the 
positioning of the central banks of anchor currencies in one-dimensional space. Short-
term interest rates vary extensively and do not move in a parallel fashion. The differences 
among the short-term rates are relatively small and the differential between Japanese and 
US/European rates becomes slightly more pronounced only in the 1990s. Such behavior 
is consistent with our model specification, which assumes that central banks use a latent 
variable (with the largest loading factor being associated with the interest rate) for 
positioning purposes in the one-dimensional policy space. Evidence shows that interest 
rates interact over time; disparities due to central banks altering the interest rate have 
been adjusted quickly. 
 
4.2 Empirical Econometrics and Statistical Inference 
In our model we assume that the central bank of an anchor currency uses the interest rate 
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as a major factor forming the latent (unknown) policy instrument that is used for 
positioning purposes within the one-dimensional space. Our model predicts that a change 
in this instrument ultimately leads to a change in the choice of satellite countries with 
respect to their ties to anchor currencies. To provide an empirical context to our model 
we formulate the specification in the form of a system of equations, which directly 
corresponds to the two stages of the model. 
In the first stage of the model a central bank is positioning itself within the one-
dimensional space by setting an interest rate. The first equation is formulated in the spirit 
of the policy rules suggested by Taylor (1993), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) or 
Woodford (2001) in which interest rate is determined based on information derived from 
inflation and aggregate output.27 In our case we formulate the specification in which 
change in interest rate ( ) is a function of inflation and growth of the aggregate output 
and its lagged values: 
i
tsr∆
1 2 1 1 2 1
i i i i i i
t t t t tsr c y y uβ π β π γ γ−∆ = + + + + + t−
                                                
.             (1) 
Here c is a constant, πt is inflation in country i, and yt is aggregate output growth rate in 
country i. The specification is in line with the objective of an anchor currency’s central 
bank in our model, which is price stability.28 
The second equation captures the change in the total amount of monetary aggregate 
with respect to changes in interest rates. This is a direct representation of the second stage 
of the model, when the satellite currencies adjust their ties to anchor currencies. Thus we 
formulate the following model: 
t
JP
t
EU
t
US
t
i
t srsrsrM εααα +∆+∆+∆=∆ −−− 131211 ,             (2) 
where the left-hand, explained, variable is the change in the (relative) amount of money 
expressed in the anchor currency ( ); it is measured as relative money in terms of the 
percentage of the total “world” monetary aggregate.29 This amount of money contains 
i
tM∆
 
27 Taylor (1993) suggested feedback policy rule while Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) argued for a forward 
looking rule. Woodford (2001) incorporated into the monetary policy model a feedback rule with target 
values. 
28 Using specification (1) without lags yields results that are not materially different when lags are included. 
Based on a formal test we opt to use less parsimonious model. 
29A measure of the relative amount of money is used because in our stylized model we assume a world in 
which all satellite currencies are tied to anchor currencies. Since in reality (condensed in the data) some 
currencies are occasionally not tied to an anchor currency, we need to re-scale the total monetary aggregate 
and work with  percentage proportions rather than absolute amounts. 
 19
monetary aggregates of the satellite currencies expressed in an anchor currency (via 
exchange rate) plus the aggregate of the monetary currency itself. As in (1), itsr∆  
represents the change in interest rate. The change in the amount of total money represents 
the second stage of the model, when the satellite currencies adjust their ties to anchor 
cu
tifying restrictions at the 1% test level and in this
sen
ctural instability, and we employ them in a manner 
sim
                                                
rrencies. 
From econometrical point of view an issue of endogeneity of interest rate with respect 
to monetary aggregate arises. The endogeneity may hamper estimates from specification 
(2) if it was estimated directly. Our two equation approach fortunately allows to 
successfully dealing with the endogeneity issue. Specification (1) actually employs 
inflation and output growth along with its lagged values and constant as instrumental 
variables and as such it yields predicted values for the interest rate (ut). Therefore, we use 
these predicted values, instead of interest rates, when estimating (2) and this way we 
avoid the endogeneity problem. The instrumental variables pass the formal Sargan-Wu, 
Hansen J and Bassman tests of overiden  
se they qualify as valid instruments. 
As for the estimation technique, we estimate the system of equations by employing the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) with instruments described above. When 
employing the GMM we use a moving window approach for the following reason. As 
noted earlier, the time from the 1950s to the present can be divided into three periods: A 
general tie with the US dollar during the Bretton Woods era, followed by a period of 
general floating with a few formal arrangements in force that was later replaced by the 
tripolar currency world. When we again observe Figures 6-7 depicting the evolution of 
interest rates and monetary aggregates, we witness unstable development with structural 
breaks that should be accounted for by using an appropriate methodology.30 To overcome 
the time-varying nature of the data, we adopt the rolling estimate approach of Bannerjee, 
Lumsdain and Stock (1992). We form a moving window that is a constant (15-year) 
fraction of the full sample and that rolls through the sample. Use of rolling windows 
effectively allows for possible stru
ilar to that of Swanson (1998). 
To sum, in our study we use rolling 15-year fixed windows (samples) of data to 
 
30 Granger (1996) points out that structural instability may be the most important problem facing 
forecasters today. 
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estimate the relationship between the monetary aggregate of an anchor currency and three 
key interest rates.31 By taking this approach we make allowances for that the system may 
be evolving over time, and we account for potential sub-sample instability. We estimate 
our model for the three anchor currencies using the sequence of the moving windows 
over the whole span of data. Coefficient estimates are presented in Tables 1-3; they shed 
lig
ey should better reflect the repositioning 
pro
                                                
ht on the stability of coefficients over time. 
More relevant is how the fit of our specification evolves over time, though. The fit is 
measured by R2 and is presented in Figure 8. Degree of the fit suggests how much of the 
positioning (of the anchor central banks) and regrouping among the satellite currencies 
with respect to anchor ones took place. Recall that the central banks of the anchor 
currencies use a latent variable proxied by the short-term interest rate for their 
repositioning and that this process is dependent on exchange rate arrangements. 
Therefore, we should expect the fit of our model to be low during the Bretton Woods era 
since, by definition, no changes in ties to the dollar were possible. We should also expect 
a low fit during the period of general float since the former anchor was lost; some 
arrangements began to emerge but no firm structures were yet established as a general 
principle. With the emergence of the European Monetary System, its later transformation 
to the Economic and Monetary Union, and the increased strength of the Japanese 
economy, changes in aggregate measures of mon
cess and the fit of the model should increase. 
The above hypotheses are confronted with the actual fit of the specification (2) 
presented in Figure 8. We do witness a very low fit of the model during the first period 
until the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, a visible increase of the fit during the 
period of a general float, and a dramatic increase in 1979 (inception of the EMS). The 
magnitude of the fit during all three periods naturally differs for the three currencies. The 
fit during the last period, and especially since the mid 1980s, is a very good result for the 
model specified in differences (20-40% for the DEM/ECU/euro-linked currencies, 30-
50% for the yen-linked currencies, and 10-20% for the dollar-linked currencies). Further, 
 
31 As a robust check we employ a wider moving window (using 20 years instead of 15) and we also impose 
restriction that IV variables are used only within the framework of the same country; e.g US output growth 
and inflation are used to predict US interest rate changes only and similarly for Europe and Japan. The 
results are robust with respect to these changes and are available upon a request. 
In a similar spirit to our approach, rolling estimates were recently applied by Bovi (2005), Patel and 
Shoesmith (2004), Andreou and Ghysels (2002), Smith and Taylor (2001), and Smith (2000). 
 21
the fit of the model is driven by the interest rate of an anchor currency as well as by the 
interest rates of its competitors, whose influence on the model’s fit is remarkable and 
co
 the predictions of our 
the
                                                
nfirms that repositioning takes place according to the two-stage game model. 
In sum, the fit of our specification is high during the period when repositioning of the 
central banks could effectively take place and is low when it could not (Bretton Woods’ 
peg followed by a general float). In other words, we see an inverted-U shaped curve of 
the fit after the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, when positioning could take place. 
The expected pattern of the inverted-U shape is present for the yen and the euro. In the 
case of the dollar, the inverted-U shape is not clearly present because the fit is below any 
reasonable level of significance; nevertheless, this does not disprove that positioning is 
taking place. These results are fully consistent with and support
oretical model concerning the behavior of satellite countries.32 
Our results have provocative implications with respect to recent developments. As the 
euro has gained in value against the dollar, central banks in Japan, China, and other Asian 
countries have bought dollars to hold down the value of their own currencies. The total 
reserves of the four largest Asian economies - China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan - 
have more than doubled over the 2001-2003 period and reached 1.5 trillion US dollars, 
most of it held in American government securities. China itself, until recently (mid-
2005), kept its currency tightly pegged to the US dollar, which was greatly upsetting non-
dollar allied Europe.33 The European Union appealed to China to let its currency float and 
to Japan to discontinue its interventions on the yen-dollar market. The EU’s rationale 
behind these appeals was to enhance stability among the exchange rates of the anchor 
currencies. Our conclusions would indicate just the opposite. In fact, if China kept its link 
to the dollar and Japan pegged the yen in some way, our model predicts that the overall 
situation would lean towards a two-currency equilibrium.34 China's recent move of 
 
32 When we extend the exposition one step further, our model offers an explanation why Japan is not 
simply monetizing its debt: according to our model, if they did, one would expect  them to lose pegged 
small currencies, which is bad. 
33 China has kept its currency, the yuan, virtually fixed at 8.28 CNY/USD for the last eleven years. China's 
central bank adjusted the yuan’s value to 8.11 CNY/USD on July 21, 2005 and announced that it would 
manage it by reference to the basket of currencies of its main trading partners. The composition of the 
basket was revealed on August 10, 2005:  it is dominated by the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and 
the South Korean won, and also contains  the Australian, Canadian and Singapore dollars, the British 
pound, the Malaysian ringgit, the Russian rouble and the Thai baht. It is estimated (Deutsche Bank) that the 
US dollar is the largest component of the basket, with a 30 percent weighting. The euro and yen  likely take 
up 20 percent each and the won 10 percent. 
34 This is in line with recent arguments made by McKinnon (2004) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004). 
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pegging its currency to a currency basket represented most heavily by the dollar, euro, 
nd yen maintains the status quo in terms of our model's predictions. 
e first place. A more general model would 
en
plicitly, we witness how 
the
ovides clear predictions that are corroborated by empirical evidence. The 
future will tell. 
a
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we build a spatial competition model in a two-stage game setup to assess 
whether stability among the world's leading currencies is attainable. We conclude that a 
stable equilibrium among the existing anchor currencies is not likely to be achieved under 
existing monetary arrangements. We show that although a stable equilibrium of exchange 
rates can arise in the case of two anchor currencies, instability is a prominent feature in 
the case of three anchor currencies. While the model naturally is a substantial 
simplification of reality, in this stylized world we hint at the right number of anchor 
currencies. Outside this stylized world our findings might still hold, but different factors 
may influence the stability. One issue our model does not address is why a specific 
number of anchor currencies might exist in th
dogenize the number of anchor currencies. 
We support the assumptions and implications of our model with both quantitative 
evidence and formal statistical inference. Our empirical results back up the predictions of 
our theoretical model concerning the behavior of satellite countries. We document large 
changes in the extent of the authoritative domain of anchor currencies as satellite 
currencies altered their ties to anchor currencies over time. Im
 monetary world has changed during the past four decades. 
Since firms, traders, and countries currently recognize three anchor currencies and 
their economic behavior reflects this, we may expect disagreement on overvaluation or 
undervaluation of certain currencies to continue. Despite the highly stylized character of 
our model, it pr
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Figure 1. Exchange Rate Deviations. (March 1973 = 100) 
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Note: euro refers to euro from 1999 onwards and to DEM and ECU prior to this date. Official fixed parities 
are used to calculate respective exchange rate.  Since the figure is in deviations, it doesn’t matter whether 
DEM, ECU, or euro is used as a common denominator.  
 
Figure 2. Inter-temporal Relative Share of Money and Countries Linked to the US Dollar 
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Figure 3. Inter-temporal Relative Share of Money and Countries Linked to the 
DEM/ECU/euro 
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Figure 4. Inter-temporal Relative Share of Money and Countries Linked to the Japanese 
yen 
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Figure 5. Inter-temporal Relative Share of Money and Countries Not-linked to any of the 
Anchor Currencies 
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Figure 6. Relative Share of Money Linked to Anchor Currencies (1964-2004) 
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Figure 7. Short-term Interest Rates of the Anchor Currencies (1964-2004) 
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Figure 8. Time dynamics of goodness-of-fit (R2) of the equation (2) computed on 
equidistant (15-years) time span from 1965 to 2004. 
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Table 1. 
Rolling 15-year fixed windows IV estimates (monetary aggregate DM/ECU/euro-linked) 
JP
t
EU
t
US
t
EU
t srsrsrM 131211 −−− ∆+∆+∆=∆ ααα  
 
Period sr(US) p-Value sr(EU) p-Value sr(JP) p-Value 
1965-1979 -0.002 0.87 -0.001 0.94 -0.006 0.33 
1966-1980 -0.004 0.77 -0.001 0.92 -0.006 0.37 
1967-1981 -0.003 0.81 0.000 0.96 -0.004 0.48 
1968-1982 -0.005 0.68 -0.001 0.94 -0.003 0.57 
1969-1983 -0.004 0.67 -0.001 0.92 -0.003 0.53 
1970-1984 -0.004 0.72 0.000 0.99 -0.004 0.46 
1971-1985 -0.002 0.88 -0.001 0.90 -0.005 0.40 
1972-1986 -0.001 0.96 -0.004 0.71 -0.003 0.56 
1973-1987 -0.002 0.84 0.002 0.84 -0.009 0.21 
1974-1988 -0.004 0.38 0.002 0.64 -0.001 0.66 
1975-1989 -0.002 0.69 -0.001 0.75 -0.001 0.71 
1976-1990 -0.002 0.66 0.000 0.97 -0.001 0.72 
1977-1991 -0.005 0.37 0.003 0.63 0.000 0.88 
1978-1992 -0.003 0.63 0.001 0.89 -0.001 0.88 
1979-1993 -0.001 0.86 -0.001 0.83 0.004 0.29 
1980-1994 -0.005 0.43 0.000 0.95 0.003 0.40 
1981-1995 0.003 0.52 -0.005 0.22 0.003 0.29 
1982-1996 0.002 0.72 -0.002 0.68 0.005 0.21 
1983-1997 0.003 0.46 -0.007 0.20 0.009 0.08 
1984-1998 0.005 0.27 -0.003 0.48 0.008 0.12 
1985-1999 0.003 0.46 -0.006 0.34 0.009 0.06 
1986-2000 0.002 0.56 -0.008 0.15 0.010 0.02 
1987-2001 0.005 0.23 -0.006 0.22 0.008 0.06 
1988-2002 0.002 0.55 -0.004 0.38 0.009 0.06 
1989-2003 0.000 0.91 -0.007 0.22 0.011 0.05 
1990-2004 -0.003 0.57 -0.009 0.15 0.013 0.06 
Note: sr(US), sr(EU) and sr(JP) stand for the US, European and Japanese short term interest 
rates, respectively. p-Value denotes statistical significance of the coefficients. 
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Table 2. 
Rolling 15-year fixed windows IV estimates (monetary aggregate dollar-linked) 
JP
t
EU
t
US
t
US
t srsrsrM 131211 −−− ∆+∆+∆=∆ ααα  
 
Period sr(US) p-Value sr(EU) p-Value sr(JP) p-Value 
1965-1979 0.008 0.75 -0.002 0.86 0.013 0.23 
1966-1980 0.001 0.95 0.001 0.92 0.011 0.32 
1967-1981 -0.003 0.90 0.002 0.91 0.010 0.39 
1968-1982 0.003 0.90 0.001 0.92 0.005 0.58 
1969-1983 0.000 0.99 0.003 0.83 0.004 0.73 
1970-1984 -0.003 0.88 0.002 0.90 0.009 0.39 
1971-1985 -0.006 0.73 0.004 0.78 0.010 0.33 
1972-1986 -0.008 0.69 0.008 0.65 0.009 0.41 
1973-1987 -0.006 0.78 0.003 0.86 0.012 0.34 
1974-1988 -0.001 0.95 0.001 0.97 0.004 0.65 
1975-1989 -0.003 0.84 0.005 0.77 0.006 0.48 
1976-1990 0.003 0.86 -0.001 0.96 0.010 0.34 
1977-1991 0.003 0.86 -0.007 0.73 0.004 0.66 
1978-1992 0.003 0.85 -0.008 0.67 0.007 0.54 
1979-1993 -0.001 0.89 0.000 0.97 0.000 0.91 
1980-1994 -0.001 0.91 0.003 0.75 0.002 0.68 
1981-1995 -0.001 0.91 0.003 0.68 0.002 0.72 
1982-1996 0.001 0.84 0.001 0.93 0.001 0.81 
1983-1997 -0.001 0.84 -0.001 0.91 0.003 0.73 
1984-1998 0.002 0.74 -0.006 0.46 0.005 0.55 
1985-1999 0.005 0.47 0.000 0.99 0.002 0.85 
1986-2000 0.008 0.17 0.000 0.97 0.000 0.97 
1987-2001 0.005 0.45 0.000 0.96 0.001 0.85 
1988-2002 0.003 0.58 -0.003 0.61 0.001 0.89 
1989-2003 0.005 0.25 -0.001 0.87 -0.001 0.92 
1990-2004 0.007 0.14 0.001 0.92 -0.002 0.79 
Note: sr(US), sr(EU) and sr(JP) stand for the US, European and Japanese short term interest 
rates, respectively. p-Value denotes statistical significance of the coefficients. 
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Table 3. 
Rolling 15-year fixed windows IV estimates (monetary aggregate yen-linked) 
JP
t
EU
t
US
t
JP
t srsrsrM 131211 −−− ∆+∆+∆=∆ ααα  
 
Period sr(US) p-Value sr(EU) p-Value sr(JP) p-Value 
1965-1979 -0.012 0.00 0.005 0.05 -0.001 0.76 
1966-1980 -0.005 0.36 0.002 0.41 -0.001 0.63 
1967-1981 -0.005 0.31 0.003 0.39 -0.001 0.82 
1968-1982 -0.006 0.22 0.003 0.40 0.000 1.00 
1969-1983 -0.006 0.14 0.003 0.34 0.001 0.80 
1970-1984 -0.007 0.08 0.004 0.18 0.000 0.86 
1971-1985 -0.005 0.24 0.003 0.36 -0.001 0.62 
1972-1986 -0.005 0.34 0.002 0.66 -0.001 0.79 
1973-1987 -0.006 0.28 0.003 0.56 -0.002 0.60 
1974-1988 -0.007 0.19 0.004 0.39 -0.001 0.79 
1975-1989 -0.007 0.17 0.005 0.30 -0.001 0.70 
1976-1990 -0.009 0.09 0.007 0.18 -0.003 0.34 
1977-1991 -0.010 0.05 0.010 0.09 -0.002 0.48 
1978-1992 -0.008 0.12 0.008 0.20 -0.001 0.79 
1979-1993 -0.008 0.07 0.007 0.17 -0.001 0.77 
1980-1994 -0.004 0.46 0.002 0.74 -0.002 0.54 
1981-1995 -0.008 0.01 0.004 0.25 -0.002 0.38 
1982-1996 -0.009 0.01 0.004 0.28 -0.003 0.28 
1983-1997 -0.008 0.01 0.004 0.33 -0.003 0.50 
1984-1998 -0.010 0.01 0.007 0.12 -0.004 0.34 
1985-1999 -0.011 0.00 0.004 0.45 -0.003 0.53 
1986-2000 -0.014 0.00 0.006 0.26 -0.002 0.66 
1987-2001 -0.014 0.00 0.002 0.68 0.000 0.92 
1988-2002 -0.009 0.03 0.003 0.50 0.000 0.97 
1989-2003 -0.007 0.05 0.004 0.38 -0.001 0.86 
1990-2004 -0.007 0.09 0.006 0.27 -0.002 0.74 
Note: sr(US), sr(EU) and sr(JP) stand for the US, European and Japanese short term interest 
rates, respectively. p-Value denotes statistical significance of the coefficients. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
(a) Assume . In that case all satellite countries choose 21 xx = 2121 == cc . 
Hence 2121 == ss . By deviating to ε−1x  or ε+1x  with 0>ε  very small, central bank 1 
can capture ε−= 11 xs  or ε−− 11 x  at a minimal increase in location costs. Hence 
unless 211 =x , central bank 1 has an incentive to deviate (as has central bank 2). Thus the 
only possible equilibrium with 21 xx =  is 2121 == xx . 
This is an equilibrium if the location costs are not too high for any of the banks. 
Consider first the case 2211 pp << . Observe that if 21 xx < , 
22111
21122
1 12
2 xxxx
x
x xx
zx xdzxs +−−
− =+=+= ∫  and hence 2111 =∂∂xs . Thus also the derivative of  
from the left at 
is
2
1
21 == xx  equals 21 . Since ( ) ( ) ( )iiiiii pxLxsxG −′−′=′ , we get for the 
derivative from the left ( ) 0211 >′G  if ( ) ( ) 21121121 2 ≤−=−′ papL  or ap 41211 −≥ . In that 
case, 1 has no incentive to marginally deviate from 211 =x  to 211 <x  if 212 =x  since its 
loss in  would not be compensated by a sufficient reduction of location costs. Since 
 a deviation to any 
1s
0>′′L 211 <x  would not pay. Clearly, a deviation to 211 >x  does not 
pay, because it would yield a smaller  at higher location costs. Likewise, we derive for 1s
2
1
2 >p  that the necessary and sufficient condition for 2 not to deviate to 212 >x  if 211 =x  
is ( ) ( ) 21221221 2 −≥−=−′ papL  or ap 41212 +≤  (since 2122 −=∂∂xs  for ). 12 xx >
Similarly, if 2112 >> pp  then the condition for bank 1 changes to ( ) 21121 −≥−′ pL  
(which always holds if ( ) 21221 −≥−′ pL  since 0>′′L ) and for 1221 pp >>  the condition 
for bank 2 changes to ( ) 21221 ≤−′ pL  (which always holds if ( ) 21121 ≤−′ pL  since ). 0>′′L
 
(b) If  and 2211 pxxp <<< ( ) 2111 =−′ pxL  ( )apxpxa 41112111 )(2 +=⇔=−⇔  and ( ) 2122 −=−′ pxL  ( )apxpxa 41222122 )(2 −=⇔−=−⇔  then since, as was shown 
above, 211
1 =∂∂xs  and 2122 −=∂∂xs , ( ) ( ) 02211 =′=′ xGxG  and hence neither bank 1 nor bank 2 
has an incentive to marginally deviate (note that 0>′′L  implies that if there is no 
incentive for a marginal deviation, there is also no incentive for a larger deviation that 
preserves ). In this case, 21 xx < 21 xx <  is obviously equivalent to app 2112 >− . 
Bank 1 would want to deviate from  to 1x ε+2x  only if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1112212 121 pxLpxLxx xx −−−>+−− − , that is, the additional gain in currency 
holdings by switching to (a position slightly to the right of)  will overcompensate the 
increase in location costs.35 Bank 1 would certainly not want to deviate to any larger x, 
because this would imply a smaller share at higher location costs. Note that there can 
only be an incentive to deviate to 
2x
ε+2x  if the preferred locations of the two anchor 
currency central banks are relatively close together but off the median of f. In other 
                                                 
35 In the following, we will ignore ε in the share and also in the costs because it can be arbitrarily small. 
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words, such an equilibrium exists, if the preferred locations of both banks are located 
rather symmetrically around 21 , are relatively far apart, or location costs are high. Note 
that  implies ( ) 00 =′L 2211 pxxp <<<  since each bank would be willing to incur some 
location costs in order to increase its share . is
By somewhat tedious, but straightforward computation we can show that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) axx ppapppxLpxLxx 41212121112212 11 12 −−≤−−⇔−−−≤+−− −  (note that 
the right-hand side is  since 0> app 2112 >− ). 
Similarly, bank 2 has no incentive to deviate to ε−1x  if ( ) ( ) ( )2221221 121 pxLpxLxx xx −−−≤+−− −  which is equivalent to 
( ) appapp 4121212 1 −−≤−+ . Hence no bank has an incentive to deviate if 
( ) appapp 41212211 −−≤−− . 
(c) As was shown in (a) no equilibrium exists with 2121 ≠= xx . Point (b) states 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium with 2211 pxxp <<< . It is 
obvious that bank 1 would profit from deviating from an  with 1x 211 xpx << , 
,  or 121 pxx << 112 xpx << 121 xxp <<  because 1 could simultaneously increase  
and lower location costs. Similarly, 
1s
122 xpx << , 212 xxp << ,  and 
 are impossible. This covers all possible constellations of locations. If there 
is a “smallest policy unit ε”, then there could in principle be constellations 
221 xpx <<
212 pxx <<
121 pxx <−= ε . Bank 1 would then not wish to deviate to  (or anything larger) if 
. In that case, however, bank 2 would want to deviate to  (as long as ε is small 
enough such that the increase in location costs is negligible). This situation leads to the 
requirement 
2x
21 ss > 1x
2
1
12
1 ≤≤− xε  and we are essentially back in case (a). The remaining cases 
with the smallest possible policy unit would be solved in a similar way. QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(a) Step 1: bank 2 does not want to deviate: 
Note that for all  with 2x 321 xxx << , ( )13212 xxs −=  and, hence, bank 2 has no 
incentive to deviate to any such  since it will not affect  but will cause positive 
location costs. If bank 2 deviates to 
2x 2s
ε−= 12 xx , then its share is  (we will again ignore 
ε in the share and also in the costs because it can be arbitrarily small). Deviating does not 
pay, therefore, if  which is (as again tedious but straightforward 
computation shows) equivalent to the first part of (3). If bank 2 deviates to , then 
1x
( 21*21 pxLsx −≤− )
1x
222
1
*
2 xss += , so if deviating to ε−1x  does not pay, deviating to  definitely does not 
pay. If bank 2 deviates to 
1x
ε+= 32 xx  then 32 1 xs −= ; so deviating does not pay if 
, which is equivalent to the first part of (4). If bank 2 deviates to 
, then 
( 23*231 pxLsx −≤−− )
3x 2
1
22
3
*
2 xss −+= ; so if deviating to ε+3x  does not pay, then deviating to  
definitely does not pay. 
3x
Step 2: bank 1 does not want to deviate: 
Since ( ) ( ) 214111 =′=−′ aLpxL  the marginal location costs of bank 1 at  are equal to 1x
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the marginal gain in , hence bank 1 has no incentive to marginally deviate and 
condition (1) is equivalent to 
1s
21 px ≤ .  Since 0>′′L , bank 1 has no incentive to deviate 
to any . 2px <
Bank 1 does not want to deviate to any x with 32 xxp << : Note that 21 23 pxs −=  for all 
such x. Hence bank 1 would, if anything choose ε+2p . Bank 1 will not deviate to  
ε+2p  if ( ) ( )111222 1223 pxLppLxppx −−−≤− +− , which is equivalent to the second part of 
(3). 
Bank 1 does not want to deviate to ε+3x  because bank 2 does not want to deviate to 
ε+3x , as can be seen by the following argument. For ease of notation let 1xA = , 
,  and 12 xpB −= 23 pxC −= 31 xD −= . Assume that bank 1 wants to deviate to ε+3x , 
i.e. ( ) ( 2112132 pxapxaAD B −−−>−− ) , but bank 2 does not, i.e. ( )2232 pxaD BC −≤− + . 
Observe that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) =−−−+−=−−− 21121223211213 pxapppxapxapxa  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 22231223211212223 2 Cpxapppxapxappapxa +−≥−−+−−−+−=
. 
Hence, the above assumptions imply that ( ) 222232 BCB DpxaAD −≥+−>−− , which 
can obviously not be true. 
By deviating to , bank 1 would obtain the average of the shares that it obtains at 2p
ε−2p  and ε+2p , so if it does not want to deviate to either of these, it does not want to 
deviate to  either, and by a parallel argument it does not want to deviate to . 2p 3x
Deviating to any other location is dominated because it yields the same or a lower  
at a higher location cost than one of the options discussed above.  
1s
 
Step 3: bank 3 does not want to deviate: 
The situation of bank 3 is symmetric to that of bank 1 and hence the conditions are 
derived in a completely parallel way. 
The above analysis shows that conditions (1) to (4) are sufficient for ( )  being 
an equilibrium, but also necessary for an equilibrium with 
321 ,, xpx
321 xpx <<  and 321 xxx << . 
(b) Step 1: banks 1 and 2 do not want to deviate: Note that since  we have 313 xx =
21
13 xxx −= , so deviations to x with 31 xxx <<  also yield 12 13 xs xx == −  but since 
 the location costs are higher. A deviation to 121 xpp ≤< 1xx <  implies a reduction of s 
by 21
xx − . Since apxpx 411121 ≤−<− , we have ( ) ( ) 211121 ≤−′<−′ pxLpxL . Thus the 
decrease in location costs is smaller than the loss in s and a deviation to  does not 
pay. Finally, a deviation to 
1xx <
ε+3x  does not pay for bank 2 if 
, which is equivalent to (5). Since  and 
, deviating to 
( ) ( 2123131 pxLpxLxx −−−≤−− ) 0>′′L
21 pp < ε+3x  does not pay for bank 1 if it does not pay for bank 2. 
 
Step 2: bank 3 does not want to deviate: since apx 4133 −= , ( ) 2133 −=−′ pxL  and hence 
bank 3 does not want to deviate to any . Since 1xx > 131*3 xs >> , a deviation to ε−1x  or 
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1x  implies a lower share at a higher location cost and hence bank 3 has no incentive to 
deviate.  
 
(c) This is just the symmetric situation to (b). The proof is essentially identical. 
(d) There are no further equilibria. 
Step 1: as established above, the equilibrium in (a) is the only equilibrium with 
 and . There can be no equilibrium with  but 
, because in that case bank 2 could, by deviating to x with 
321 xpx << 321 xxx << 321 xxx <<
12 xp ≤ 21 xxx << , obtain the 
same  at lower location costs.36 By a parallel argument, there is also no equilibrium 
with  but . Hence the equilibrium in (a) is the only equilibrium with 
. 
2s
321 xxx << 23 px ≤
321 xxx <<
Step 2:  implies 321 xxx <= 21 13 xxx −=  otherwise bank 1 or 2 could, by a marginal 
deviation, increase its share at essentially 0 increase in location costs. This then implies 
  because any x with 121 xpp ≤< 31 xxx <<  yields the same share, so if , bank 2 
could obtain the same share at lower location costs. Hence the equilibrium in (b) is the 
only equilibrium with . 
12 xp >
321 xxx <=
 
Step 3: by the same argument as in step 2, the only equilibrium with  is the 
equilibrium in (c).  
321 xxx =<
 
Step 4:  cannot be an equilibrium: in this case 321 xxx == 31=is  and by a marginal 
deviation bank i could obtain ( ) 2111 1,max ≥− xx . 
Step 5: in equilibrium 312 xxx ≤<  is impossible, because in that case  or 
 and, hence, one bank could lower its location costs while increasing or retaining 
its share (note that as was argued in the proof of part (b), if in equilibrium  then 
11 xp <
22 px <
31 xx =
32 123 x
xx −=− , so by deviating to x with 32 xxx << , bank 1 would obtain the same , as 
it is also the case for ). On the other hand, 
1s
31 xx < 312 xxx <=  corresponds to the 
equilibrium in (b), so all cases 312 xxx ≤≤  are covered (in case of equality of all x, step 
4 applies). 
Step 6: the argument why any constellation, 231 xxx <≤ , 132 xxx ≤≤ , 123 xxx ≤≤ , 
 cannot occur in equilibrium is the same as in step 5: at least one bank can 
reduce its location costs without reducing its share if at least one inequality is strict; 
otherwise the argument of step 4 applies. 
213 xxx ≤≤
This covers all possible constellations of , , and  and shows that no equilibrium 
except for those in (a), (b), and (c) exist. QED 
1x 2x 3x
                                                 
36 If there is a “smallest policy unit ε” then there could be an equilibrium where 321 xxx <<  but 
, namely if 12 xp ≤ ε+= 12 xx  and  is larger than , but in that case bank 1 would have an 
incentive to deviate to , unless the difference in shares is very small, so this essentially corresponds to 
the equilibrium in (b). 
2s 1s
2x
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